Corporate Incentives and Gradual Disempowerment

Michaelmas 2026 project

Matt Endres

Research questions

Do automated corporations that maximise profit lead to gradual disempowerment? If yes, what are the mechanisms?

The core argument

Profits are an imperfect measure of human welfare. Maximising profits can lead to increasing income and wealth which in turn can increase welfare. However, there are at least two reasons why profit maximisation and welfare maximisation differ. (1) externalities (2) endogenous preferences.

  1. Externalities: The classic case is pollution: industry creates products which are desired by some. However, this might affect people negatively which are not part of the market interaction.

  2. Endogenous preferences: consider two levels of preferences: what we want (first order) and what we want to want (second order). Algorithms might be affecting already first order preferences by changing content view and production. For example it seems plausible that a person doomscrolling or writing angry responses on Facebook might have slid into that behaviour partially due to the design of the platform. Plausibly, even second order preferences might be affected, although this is even harder to prove.

This project has two aims: First, validate hypotheses about negative effects of profit motivated corporations. Second, extrapolate how these effects might play out under transformative AI. We will develop or adapt a stylised formal model if the time allows.

The project might be structured around how firms become less constrained by (a) their workers, (b) governments and (c) consumers/voters.

(a) Currently workers wish to constrain the management of corporations. For example, Google’s “Don’t be evil” principle might have been a tool to retain top talent who wanted to work for a company that aligned with their values. The less workers are necessary, the less these human preferences affect companies.

(b) AI empowers corporations against governments. First, one factor that is hard to relocate is workers. If workers are automated, threatening governments to re-locate might be more effective. Second, corporations in industries without strong network effects are typically most profitable at an intermediate size, due to congestion effects between human workers. AI might enable larger firms which have more leverage over governments. Third, and this is more uncertain, automation could go faster in corporations than governments, following past technologies. This, again, would increase the power of corporations relative to governments - for example it could make lobbying easier and change regulation to their favour.

(c) Corporations might also affect consumer preferences more effectively with advertisements or by influencing their information environment (social media, newspapers, television channels, …). This in turn might limit how effectively those consumers will control the government.

The goal of this project is to check if this list is comprehensive, and sufficient to lead to a catastrophic scenario.

Impact case

The fiduciary duty of the corporation can be changed. This piece explores if a catastrophe looms if it remains profit maximisation. The idea is not new and floats in different literatures and comment threads in LessWrong. But there is not enough work that synthesises ideas, maps mechanisms and assumptions that need to hold for these mechanisms to work. This lays the foundation for future work which then can test those assumptions.

In other words, we do foundational work to structure a research agenda which clarifies if substituting the profit motive of the corporation with another fiduciary duty is a core lever to avoid gradual disempowerment, or not. If it turns out that it could be a core lever, this research could inspire policy makers to implement this change of the fiduciary duty before AI takes off and diffuses in the economy. If the opposite is the case, the AI safety and governance community has one worry less and can focus on other levers.

Output

The output is a conceptual paper, a one-page executive summary for policy makers and a summary for LessWrong. The format will be similar to Forethought papers, scaled down to a version doable for the participants in the allocated time.

Timeline

Week 1-2:

  • Literature review/ synthesis of LessWrong discussion

  • Mapping the project, stakeholder outreach

Week 3-5:

  • Synthesizing different perspectives

  • Analysing mechanisms

  • Writing case studies

  • Minimal model (if time available)

Week 6-8:

  • Policy analysis

  • Write-up

  • Submission

Ideal candidate

This is a project to test fit for AI strategy research. Candidates with an interest in structuring fuzzy ideas. A lot of the research is clearer defining the problem rather than finding a solution to a known problem. Participants who prefer a precise and clear problem might benefit less. That said, the project still has the aim to build a foundation for an analytical understanding, rather than an essayist reflection.

Overall:

  • Enjoys bringing structure to fuzzy ideas, structure problems

  • Able and interested in engaging with formal arguments

  • Interested in interdisciplinary research

Candidate specific:

  • Analyst: Background in Economics, PPE or similar. Analytical thinking. Ability and interest in building formal models is a plus but not required.

  • Subject Specialist: Business studies, law, sustainable development or similar. Knowledge or interest in how the negative side effects of profit motive are constrained in practice.